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Faculty and Deans

THE TREATY POWER AND FAMILY LAW
Jerome]. Curtis, Jr.*
Several commentators have urged the treaty power as the basis for
federal promulgation of uniform domestic relations laws. Professor
Curtis in this Article analyzes the limitations on the treaty power in
the area of domestic relations. It is the position of Professor Curtis that
limitations imposed by the tenth amendment~ as well as those inherent
in the constitutional grant of the treaty power~ itself~ preclude any federal preemption in this area.

I. INTRODUCTION
HE promulgation and enforcement of laws regulating the family
have long been considered to be the exclusive concern of the individual states.1 With the exception of the restrictions imposed by the
fourteenth amendment,2 the federal government has never assumed
affirmative responsibilities over such matters.a Rather, each state has
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• Assistant Professor of Law, l\farshall·Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1964: J.D., Uni\·ersity of California,
Hastings College of Law, 1967: LLM., University of Virginia, 1972. Member of the C:ili·
fornia and Virginia Bars.
1 In explaining the aflirm.ative vote of the United States in support of the United
Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 1\f.ani:lge and Rcgistta·
tion of Marriages, the United States' representative said:
In my country under our Constitution, marriage traditionally h:ls been a subject
within the competence of the respective state governments. Legislation in force in
our varions state jurisdictions is in conformity with the principles of the M:utiage
Convention •••• In view of our Constitutional system my Go\·emment, in consider·
ing ratification of the Convention, will do so with the understanding that the rati.fi·
cation by the United States will be regarded as constituting a recognition and not
an impairment of the constitutional rights of the respective states of the United
States to regulate marriages within their jurisdictions.
U.N. Doc. AJPV 1167, at 33·35 (1962). This is reproduced in Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights, 12 AM. J. Com>. L 337, 858 (1963).
2 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 871 (1971) (holding the imposition of court
costs upon indigents seeking divorce in state courts unconstitutional): Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a state statute barring an illegitimate child
from xecovering for the wrongful death of his mother when legitimate children were
permitted to recover); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (holding state miscegenation
statute unconstitutional).
3 Federal courts have even made an exception to the di\•ersity jurisdiction statute. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), and have denied di,•ersity jurisdiction O\'er domestic relations cases.
This exception was first developed when the diversity statute granted jurisdiction of
"suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity." Act of 1\larch 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24,
36 Stat. 1091. It was thought that domestic relations cases, being matters which would
have been heard in the ecclesiastical courts, did not .fit this description. C. Wrucur, FEDERAL CoURTS § 25, at 84 (2d ed. 1970). The 1948 Judicial Code, Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
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been left free to determine the conditions under which persons within
its borders may marry, divorce, adopt children, or perform any other
646, § 1332, 62 Stat. 930, substituted the term "civil action" for the phrase used in the
older statute, but the exception has persisted. Today the exception may be more ra·
tionally defended on the ground that this is an area of the law in which states have an
especially strong interest and great competence in dealing.
The exception originated in dictum in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) li82, li81
(1859). There the Court held that a wife could sue on the basis of diversity in a federal
court in Wisconsin to enforce the decree of a New York state court that granted her a
divorce and alimony; but it added:
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding
in chancery or as an incident to a divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board.
Id. In another sweeping statement the Supreme Court later said, "the whole subject o£
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. li86, 593·91
(1890). For another early statement of the states' exclusive jurisdiction over domestic rc·
lations cases, see Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 90 (1888) (stating marriage is an institution
of society, regulated and controlled by public authority and divorce statutes were within
the competency of state legislatures).
Thus, the federal courts have not entertained actions involving questions of matrl·
monial status and have also not heard "domestic relations" cases involving only property
rights. E.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) (state court had jurisdlc·
tion of an action for divorce against the consul of a foreign country though normally
federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1351 have exclusive jurisdiction of actions against con·
suls); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960) (where wife had not obtained entry
of judgment by New York courts for accrued and unpaid separation decree installments,
federal court was not required to give full faith and credit to decree and lacked juris·
diction to enforce payments); Ostrom v. Ostrom, 231 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955) (no power
for federal court to compel husband to comply with terms of interlocutory divorce de·
cree entered by California state court); Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389 r,:.v .D. Pa. 1971)
(divorce action by Pennsylvania resident against Pennsylvania resident not properly re·
movable to federal court); Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754 (D. Colo. 1965) (case not
removable to federal court where plaintiff sought divorce, alimony and declaratory and
injunctive relief relating to realty); Bercovitch v. Tanburn, 103 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) (no federal court jurisdiction for Canadian mother·in·law to recover money ex·
pended for necessities allegedly provided to defendant's wife); Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F.
Supp. 802 (S.D. Iowa 1951) (no federal court jurisdiction to revoke separation agreement
entered into by parties as husband and wife).
The federal courts have also refused to hear child custody cases. E.g., In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593·94 (1890) (federal court order granting habeas corpus to obtain custody of a
child was absolutely void and could be disregarded with impunity). Buechold v. Ortiz,
401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (no jurisdiction of case involving paternity and child sup•
port); In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La. 1967) (action by husband seeking ndop•
tion under Louisiana statutes of wife's two minor children born of prior marriage was
not removable to federal court on ground of diversity of citizenship); Drandtschcit v.
Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction
in action by foreign citizen against citizen of California to establish paternity and to
provide support for an illegitimate child).
One of the few instances of affirmative federal legislation in family law matters is 22
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essentially familial act. Thus, while a citizen of Nevada may be permitted a divorce upon the shm'ling of incompatibility;' another state
may provide much more restrictive grounds.11 However, several commentators,6 who desire uniform domestic relations laws, have proposed
the treaty power7 as a way to preempt the area; and they point to the
participation of the United States in international efforts to formulate
uniform domestic relations laws.8 This Article examines the attempts
to involve the United States in these efforts and reviews the constitutional bases for the proposed involvement.
II.

POTENTIAL 0BUGATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAw

The United States Constitution makes federal statutes and treaties
the supreme law of the land insofar as they comport with the requirements of the Constitution itsel£.9 Accordingly, under the supremacy
U.S.C. § 1172 (1970), which authorizes United States' consuls abroad to perform IIW'riages
if the parties are competent to marry under the laws of the District of Columbia. The
constitutionality of this statute apparently has never been tested.
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1968); accord, e.g., .ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.110 (1962); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961).
5 New York, for example. limited the grounds for divorce to adultery until 1966 when
the legislature began to increase the number of grounds. Compare N.Y. Do!J. REI.. LAw
§ 170 (MdGnney 1964) with N.Y. Do:r.r. REI.. LAw § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1972). :hfass:tchusetts limits the grounds for divorce to adultery, utter desertion for two consecutive
years, impotency, gross and confirmed habits of intoxication caused by \'Oluntary use of
liquor or drugs, cruel and abusive treatment, and gross or wanton and cruel .f:illure to
provide support. MAss. GEN. LAws .ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (1972). For a statute listing twcl\·e
common grounds for divorce, see GA. CoDE ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1971).
6 E.g., Dorsey, Subject-Matter Limitations on the Treaty Power, 4 ll.'T'L LAw. 209 (1970);
Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L REV.
1012 (1968); Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law .Makers: Tile Law of tile Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L REV. 903 (1959); Mosler, Tile Protection of Human
Rights by International Legal Procedures, 52 GEO. LJ. 800 (1964): Nadclmann, Tile
United States joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 30 LAw 8: CoNTEMP. PROB. 291 (1965).
7 U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, ci. 2 provides: "He [the President] shall ha\·e Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to m:lke Treaties, pro\'ided two thirds of the
Senators present concur."
s See Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra
note 6; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: Tile Law of tile Land and
Foreign Relations, supra note 6.
9 U.S. CoNsr. art. VI provides in part: "This Constitution, and the I.:J.ws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties m:1de, or which shall
be made. under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme I.:J.w of the
Land." Since this language does not indicate directly that treaties must conform with
the Constitution while statutes are explicitly required to do so, one might argue that
there are no constitutional limitations upon the treaty power. The view that treaties arc
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clause, a lawful exercise of the treaty power by the federal government
will vitiate any state law in conflict with the treaty.10 In view of the su~
premacy of treaties and of the fact that the potential machinery already
exists within the international community for fashioning changes in
family laws, it is not surprising that many scholars have advanced the
treaty power as the appropriate vehicle for imposing federal standards
upon state family laws. The Hague Conference on Private International
Law, which has been functioning for seventy-nine years, currently in·
eludes the United States among its twenty-three member nations.11 The
not subject to the same constitutional limitations as are statutes finds support in the
supremacy clause itself, and in an ambiguous suggestion by Justice Holmes in Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Justice Holmes said:
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of
the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the author·
ity of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United
States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention.
Id. Fortunately, some doubt has been cast on the propriety of such an interpretation in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Justice Black, speaking for the Court, noted by way of
dicta that treaties, like laws, must be made "in pursuance of" the Constitution and that
no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of the Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitu·
tion •••• There is nothing in this language [the supremacy clause] which intimates
that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution .
• • • The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches
of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the
Executive and the Senate combined.
Id. at 16-17.
Perhaps the best known statement of the implied limitation on the treaty power is
that made by Justice Field in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890):
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the govern·
ment or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to
authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the govern·
ment or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of
the latter, without its consent •••• But with these exceptions, it is not percclved
that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter
which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.
Id. at 267.
10 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Geofroy v. Riggs, 183 U.S. 258 (1890);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11 Statute on the Hague Conference of Private International Law, July 15, 1955, 220
U.N.T.S. 121. The Hague Conference, which met for the first time in 1898 as a result of
an initiative of the government of the Netherlands, was transformed into a permanent
institution through a charter drawn up at the Seventh Session of the Conference in 1951.
The Charter entered into force on July 15, 1955. In accordance with article 2 thereof, ad·
mission to membership becomes definitive upon acceptance of the Charter by the State
concerned.
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avo1ved objective of the Conference is to foster the unification of the
rules of private intemationallaw.12 Characteristic of its efforts in the
family law field are its various international conventions on adoptions,
divorce, -marital separations, and annulments.13

A. Convention on Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees
One development in the Hague Conference which might pose a
threat to the hegemony of the domestic relations powers of the American states is the Conference's Convention on Recognition of Foreign
Divorce Decrees which was approved at its 1968 meeting.u This Convention would require ratifying nations to recognize and enforce the
divorce and separation decrees of other nations111 even in those instances
where no grounds for divorce or separation exist under the law of the
reviewing forum or where the choice of law rules of the reviewing forum would otherwise require that the judgment be ignored. In effect,
the Convention would enact a full faith and credit rule for the international community.
It is elementary American constitutional law that full faith and
credit attaches only to the judgments of sister states, and then only if
the rendering forum had jurisdiction.16 There is nothing in the United
_ l2 Id. at 123. Article 1 of the Charter of the Hague Conference on Internation:ll L:iw
provides that the Conference will "work for the progressive unifiCltion of the rules of
private international law."
13 See 52 DEP'T SrATE BULL. 1339, at 265 (1965). The agenda for the Tenth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law listed she major items, four of l'lhich
concerned draft conventions on the following subjects: (1) recognition and enforcement
of foreigu judgments; (2) international adoption of children; (3) service abro:~d of judici:ll
and extrajudicial documents; (4) agreements on the choice of court. The fifth major item
dealt with an exploratory questionnaire on status judgments im·olving dh·orce, legal
sepaxation, and annulment of marriage. The shcth major item ll':lS a request for topics
to comprise the agenda of future sessions of the Hague Conference.
14 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Sep:~rations (19GS).
This convention is reproduced in 1\!ehren &: Nadelmann, The Hague Conference Convention of June I, 1970 on Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees, 5 F.ur. LQ. 303, 309·18
(1971).
15 Article 2 provides in part: "Such divorces and legal sep:~rations sh:lll be recognized
in .all other Contracting States, subject to the remaining terms of this Com·ention ••••"
Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Sep:~rations, art. 2; l\fehren
&: Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 309.
16 The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § I, as in·
terpreted by the Supreme Court determines the conditions under which the decrees Of
the courts of one state are to be recognized in other states. The Supreme Court has ar·
rived at the doctrine that full faith and credit will be given di\·orce decrees only if one
of the parties to the action was domiciled at the tinte of the divorce in the state where
the divorce was granted. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 {1945). See generally .Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d '180 (2d Cir.
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States system which compels a state to enforce a judgment obtained in
a foreign country-not even where the foreign court possessed jurisdic·
tion. Yet, if the United States were to ratify the Convention and de·
clare that the Convention extends to all its legal systems,17 the federal
government would have assured the world community that the states
could and would be compelled to enforce foreign judgments. This as·
sertion of plenary power by the federal government would constitute a
marked deviation from the traditional federal role of deference to state
autonomy in certain matters. While this novel use of the treaty power
is not without its advocates,l8 thus far the United States has been un·
willing to depart from the traditional viewpoint.10
B.

Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage
and Registration of Marriages

Perhaps the most innovative proposal to emanate from the Hague
Conference is the United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.20 This Con·
vention was opened for signature by the United Nations in 1962, and
although the Convention has not yet been ratified by the Senate, the
United States is a signatory.21
1962); Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019 (1962); Kessler v. Fauquier Nat'l Dank,
195 Va. 1095, 81 S.E.2d 440 (1954).
17 Article 23 of the Convention provides that if a "Contracting State has more than
one legal system in matters of divorce or legal separation, it may, at the time of signa·
ture, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all its legal
systems or only to one or more of them ••••" Hague Convention on the Recognition of
Divorces and Legal Separations, art. 23; Mehren &: Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 811),
Thus the Convention does defer somewhat to federal systems. This provision, however,
does not address itself to the question of whether the United States has the power under
its Constitution to prescribe family laws for the states under the treaty power. Two
writers have suggested that the United States has the power to negotiate in t11e interna·
tiona! community for the recognition of American divorce decrees but perhaps lacks the
power to compel the states to recognize the decrees of foreign nations. Mehren &: Nadel·
mann, supra note 14, at 308. See also 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 797 (1965).
18 See note 6 supra.
19 The United States representative to the Conference observed that the United States
lacked the constitutional authority to compel adherence to a related convention by the
states. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Xlth Session of the Hague Conferer~cc 011
Private International Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 787·900 (1969). For a similar
observation by the United States representative to the United Nations Convention on
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962),
see note 1 supra.
20 United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage
and Registration of Marriages (1962) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Convention on Marriage).
This convention is reproduced in Schwelb, supra note 1, at 382·88.
21 Schwelb, supra note 1, at 337. Presently international law recognizes that treaties
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The principal theme of the Convention is harmless on its surface,
but beneath its apparent simplicity lurks a direct assault upon traditional American jurisprudence. Article 1(1) furnishes an apt example
of this latent danger. It requires a public affirmation of the free and
open consent of the parties prior to the marriage.:!!! One colorful example of the potential conflict betw·een the domestic law of the states
and the dictates of this Convention is the case of the "shotgun wedding."23 The general American view of such marriages, except for
those few instances where the groom is literally marched to the altar at
the end of a gun barrel, is that the groom has freely and fully consented
to the marriage.24 Thus, the coercion, however great its lack of subtlety,
become binding not upon the signature of the diplomatic agents 'Yho negotiated them
but upon the subsequent exchange of ratifications by the go\'ernments of the nations
which are parties to the treaty. Prior to the development of modern constitutional governments it was held that agents delegated to negotiate a treaty must have full power to
bind the state. Under a monarchy this ·was not a difficult hurdle, since the monarch was
the ultimate authority of domestic law and his authorization of the agent was thc:rdorc
conclusive. One other reason for the necessity of an immediate binding c:ffect on states
upon the signing of an agreement by a diplomatic agent '\'as the relath·cly slow speed of
communications. Only in the case of acts of bad faith by the authorized agent could the
treaty be repudiated by the governments which had signed it. C. F.ENWJCA, It\T.ERl'MTJONAL
LAw 434 (3d ed. 1948).
22 Article 1(1) reads:
No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both
parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in
the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage of witnesses, as
prescribed by law.
U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 1(1); Schwelb, .supra note 1, at 383. Cf. The American
Convention on Human Rights (1969). This Convention is reproduced in 9 INr'L L.EcAI.
MATERIALS 99 (1970). Several members of the Organization of American States, not includ·
ing the United States, are signatories of this Convention. The American Com·ention
echoes the Hague Convention, in requiring "full and free consent" by the p:trties to a
marriage. Id. at 106. Recognizing that federalist nations may encounter diffirulties in im·
plementing the American Convention, the draftsmen limited the obligations of ratif)ing
nations to the implementation of the Convention with respect to those subjects over
which the central government possesses "legislative and judicial jurisdiction." Id. at 109.
23 "Shotgun wedding" denotes those situations in which the pregnancy of the intended
bride has caused third parties to bring strong pressure to bear upon the father to induce
him to marry the expectant mother. See generally Wadlington, Slzotgun Marriage by Op.
eration of Law, 1 GA. L. R.Ev. 183 (1966).
24 H. CLARK, DoMESTic R:Et.AnoNs § 2.16, at 99·100 (1968). Like other consen.sual relationships, a marriage contract may be set aside in an action for annulment where it is
shown that either party entered the marriage as a result of duress. The claim of duress
is most commonly used by husbands who have been induced to marry by '-arious forms
of "persuasion" following the seduction of the wife. Howe\·cr, if the "persuasion" does
not take the form of violence or threats of violence there is no duress. For force, restrainr,
or threats to constitute duress warranting an annulment or di\·orce, they must be such as
to overcome the will and bring about a marriage to which consent would not olhend3e
have been given. See Stakelum v. Terral, 126 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1961) (annulment de·
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receives no legal recognition as a ground for annulment.25 However
a number of other countries consider coercion sufficient grounds for
annulment. 26 Arguably, then if the Convention establishes enforceable
domestic rules, the international understanding of the provisions of the
Convention would control, with the result that no state would be permitted to deny an annulment where a "shotgun wedding" has taken
place.
There are other instances of potential conflict. For example, the Convention expressly provides that marriage shall be lawful only where the
marriage contract is accompanied by a specified quantum of solemnity.
In particular, the parties must manifest their consent to their union
before both a competent authority and witnesses.27 As one commenta·
tor has observed, the formalities contained in article 1 of the United
Nations Convention are "indispensable to combat the 'institutions and
practices' the abolition of which the Convention is intended to bring
about." 28 The same ·writer has forecast difficulty in implementing the
Convention because of the "continued recognition of so-called common·
law marriages in some jurisdictions of the United States." 29 But coun·
tervailing public policies in many American states-especially the pol·
icy against bastardy-demand a mode of marriage without formal
solemnization. As late as 1922, common-law marriages were recognized
in more than half of the· states.80 At the present time only fourteen
states retain the practice.31 Presumably those states which have retained
nied to husband who had allegedly been forced to give his consent by threats of bodily
violence or death); Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Tenn. App. 19 (1928) (action for annulment al·
lowed when threats made by defendant's father). For a critical discussion of this rule,
see Wadlington, Shotgun Marriage by Operation of Law, supra note 23. For a broad
treatment of the subject of duress in the marital context, sec Kingsley, Duress as a Ground
for Annulment of Marriage, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1959).
25 See C. CLAD, H. HALsl':EAD 8: D. CROCKER, FAMILY LAW 131-32 (1964).
The "shotgun marriage" has produced many interesting annulment cases, with most
of the courts finding that the bridegroom (usually) was unwilling, but not sufficiently
so under particular sets of facts, especially when the fear might have been attributed
to possible prosecution rather than the shotgun or other implement of aggression,
It is interesting that a failure to take advantage of an opportunity to escape is viewed
by the courts as fatal to a claim of force or duress. Mere threats arc not usually
enough, no matter how imposing the appearance of the outraged relative.
I d.
26
21

28
29
80

31

See Schwelb, supra note 1, at 352-54.
U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 1(1), which is set out at note 22 supra.
Schwelb, supra note 1, at 354.
Id.
See 1 C. VERNIER, A.MERlCAN FAMILY LAWs § 26, at 106 (1931).
Common-law marriage is now recognized in Alabama, Colorado, District of Colum·
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the common-law marriage have done so for reasons considered sound
and would resist the imposition of a contrary rule by the international
community•
. Another.potential point of conflict between the Convention and the
domestic law of some states lies in the requirement that "due publicity" precede the wedding ceremony.8 2 While few states actually provide
for banns,33 many require the passage of a specified period of time benveen the issuance of a marriage license and the ceremony.:a Although
the primary purpose of these waiting periods may be to give the parties
time to ponder the seriousness of the proposed union, they also provide
a degree of publicity. Whether they require banns or merely a statutory
waiting period, most states recognize exemptions from these requirements. There are, for example, state statutes waiving publicity in cases
where "physical condition of either applicant requires the marriage to
be celebrated without delay,"85 pregnancy,sa or "good and sufficient reason" exists.37 The Convention leaves no room for exemptions of any
type. Thus American courts might find themselves precluded from expediting a marriage even in the face of a cause previously thought sufficient to outweigh the need for publicity.sa
The adoption of the Convention would do more than merely abrogate conflicting state policies. It would require a radical redefinition
bia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyh':Ulia,
Rhode Island, South Carolina and Texas. Thirty-six states had determined by 1968, either
by statute or judicial decision, not to recognize common law marriage. For a detailed
discussion of the present status of the doctrine of common-law marriage, see H. CI..utE,
DoMESTic RELATIONS § 2.4 (1968).
32 U.N. Convention on 1\farriage, art. 1(1), set out supra note 22.
33 E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 53-209 to 210 (1961) (allowing publication of banns to sub·
stitute for the license); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 89, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (recognizing banns
in the context of a Quaker wedding). The ecclesiastical requirement was that banns an·
nouncing the impending marriage were required to be published three times in a public
place before the marriage was held. See 2 PoLLOCK 8: 1\!Arri..u-"D, HisToRY OF ENcWD LAW
370 (1898) for a general discussion of banns in ecclesiastical law.
34 E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:203 (1965) (72 hours required between time of issuance
of license and performance of marriage ceremony); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5145 (Supp.
1972) (5 day waiting period must elapse after application !or license filed by town clerk
before solemnization of marriage).
85 CoNN. GEN. STATS. .ANN. § 46-5d (Supp. 1972).
36 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-202 (Supp. 1971).
37 ANN. IND. STATS. § 44.201(d) (Supp. 1972).
38 Section 204 of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr (1970) does not provide !or
any exceptions to the waiting period possibly because the period it establishes-three
days-is relatively short. The complete text of the Uniform Act is contained in l\L PAULSEN 8: W. WADLINGTON, STATUTORY :MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1-88 (1971).
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of the federal role in family affairs, since article 2 requires each signa·
tory to "take legislative action to specify a minimum age for marriage." 80
Should such legislation be passed by Congress, the stage would be set
for a clash between the federal statute and the varying laws of the in·
dividual states.
A final point of potential conflict between the Convention and state
autonomy inheres in article 3 of the Convention which provides for
registration of all marriages.40 Obviously, article 3 cannot be reconciled
with the laws of those states which permit common-law marriages.
Futhermore, there is no constitutional authority in the federal govern·
ment which would sanction a federally-imposed requirement that the
states create new or maintain present registration systems. A federal
registration system would clearly invade the province of the states.41
Shortly after the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages was approved by the
United Nations, the General Assembly adopted the Recommendation
of Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration
of Marriages.42 This Recommendation was intended to embrace those
nations not in a position to ratify the Convention.43 While the Recom·
mendation does not place such heavy responsibilities on ratifying coun·
tries as does the Convention, it is less lenient in one respect. The Rec·
ommendation stipulates a specific age of fifteen years44 under which no
person shall have capacity to marry. Since several American states pro·
vide that persons may marry at ages below age fifteen,41l the Recommen·
U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 2; Schwelb, supra note 1, at 883.
Article 8 provides: "All marriages shall be registered in an appropriate official reg·
ister by competent authority." U.N. Convention on Marriage, art. 8; Schwclb, supra note
1, at 383.
It should also be noted that article 1(2) of the Convention recognizes proxy marriages.
It provides that one party may be absent from the wedding if that party ltas consented
in advance before competent authority to the ceremony being held in absentia. The
transcript of the Conference proceedings, however, indicates that the article was intended
to be solely permissive and that no signatory would be obliged to recognize proxy mar•
riages. Thus, the article would not affect those states which do not allow proxy marriages.
Schwelb, supra note 1, at 365-71.
41 Cf. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930); In re Burrus, 186 U.S. 1186
(1890); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 1182
(1859).
42 UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27·28 (1968).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 South Carolina provides that the minimum age for marriage is fourteen In the case
of females and sixteen with respect to males. S.C. CoDE § 20·24 (1962). The South Carolina
courts, however, have held that marriages contracted by persons below these ages arc not
39
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dation would deprive the states of one of their most jealously guarded
prerogatives-the power to determine the capacity of their citizens to
marry.

C.

The United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights

At the present time, the United States has not ratified either the Convention or the Recommendation; nor is the Senate currently considering ratification. However, the United States is already a party to one international undertaking which has implications for family law-the
United Nations Charter. The United States Supreme Court has intimated that the Charter has the status of a treaty.46 Furthermore, at least
one state court has relied in part upon the Charter in invalidating a
state statute prohibiting interracial marriages.47 While the United Nations Charter, itself, may not raise many questions as to the proper
distribution of powers over domestic relations in tllis area, another pronouncement of the United Nations might-the United Nations Decvoid if they would have been valid at common law. State v. Ward, 2G-1 S.C. 210, 28 S.E.2d
785 (1944). By statute in South Carolina, the age requirements may be wah·ed in cases
of pregnancy. S.C. CoDE § 20-24.5 (Supp. 1970). Sec also VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-48 (1960);
GA. CODE .ANN. § 53-102 (Supp. 1971).
46 Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). The case invol\·ed defendant's refusal to bury a Winnebago Indian based on the contract for sale of the burial lot stating.
"burial privileges accrue ouly to members of the Caucasian race." Id. at 71. Plaintiff
claimed that this provision 1vas void under both the Iowa and United States Constitutions and that recognition of its validity would violate the fourteenth amendment. Additionally, plaintiff claimed the provision to be a violation of the United Nations Charter.
The Iowa Supreme Court, although ruling that the clause was unenforceable as a \'iolation of the Constitutions and public policy of Iowa and the United States, held that the
clause could be relied on as a defense in an action on the contract and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The Iowa court likewise held the United Nations Charter ir·
relevant. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953). The Supreme
Court affirmed. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). Writ of certiorari l\'llS
later granted and the earlier Court decision 1vas l'acated as a result of Iowa enacting a
statute to outlaw defendant's conduct. In discussing the action of the Iowa supreme
court, Justice Frankfurter stated:
In addition to the familiar though vexing problems of constitutional law, there l\'35
reference in the opinions of the Iowa courts and in the briefs of counsel to the United
Nations Charter. The Iowa courts dismissed summarily the claim that some of the
general and hortatory language of this Treaty, which so far as the United States is
concerned is itself an exercise of the treaty-making power under the Constitution,
constituted a limitation on the rights of the States and of persons othcm·ise reser\·cd
to them under the Constitution.
349 U.S. at 73 [emphasis added].
47 Perez v. Sharp, 32 CaL 2d 711, 732-33, 198 P.2d 17, 29-30 (19-18) (Carter, J., concurring). Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), declared miscegenation laws \'Oid under the United States Constitution.
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laration of Human Rights. Regardless of the juridical status of the Dec·
laration, it may become the foundation of efforts to thrust the federal
government into the role of promulgator and enforcer of family law. If
the United States should ever choose to be bound by the Declaration,
it may simultaneously become obliged to enact legislation affecting the
domestic relations laws of the states.4s
One example of a potential conflict with state laws is article 16 of the
Declaration which states that both parties to a marriage are entitled to
"equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution."411
Although there is no authoritative interpretation of this article, it
would seem to guarantee each spouse equal control and supervision
over property acquired by either during coverture and to give each a
right to half of such property upon the termination of the marriage.
Such an understanding of the property rights of spouses is common out·
side the United States50 and is consonant with the present law of the
eight community property states.51 In fact, the proposed Uniform Mar·
riage and Divorce Act incorporates a concept of marital property quite
similar to that of community property.52 While the Uniform Act is
something for each state to consider independently, article 16 may
someday be advanced by those sympathetic to the Uniform Act as justi·
fication for bypassing the state legislatures and implementing the provision at the federal level.
In a related matter, steps have already been taken to seize upon the
purported obligations of the United States under the Universal Dec·
laration and its implementing conventions to thrust the federal government into an area previously left to state regulation. In January
1971, Congressman Ryan of New York introduced a resolutionlla in the
House of Representatives proposing that the House express its approval
48

See note 112 infra.

49 Covenants on Human Rights art. 16, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, nt

49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
50 See W. DEFUNIAK &: M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 18·18 (2d
ed. 1971).
51 The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. J. CRIBBET, W. FRITZ&: C. JonNsoN, CASES AND MA·
TERIALS oN PROPERTY 186 (1960). Under community property laws generally both spouses
are entitled to an equal distribution of community property upon divorce or dissolution
of the marriage. Cf. CAL. CIV. ConE § 4800 (Supp. 1972).
52 See M. PAULSEN &: "'N. WADLINGTON, STATUTORY :MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, JUpra
note 38, at 22·23.
53 H.R. Res. 44, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This point may be moot since the passage
of the proposed U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXVII, presently subject to ratification by the states.
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of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. This Convention
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1952 to secure
to women those rights guaranteed them in several provisions of the
Universal Declaration.54 ''Women's rights" are outside the scope of this
Article, but if the traditional power of the states to enact laws under
their police powers which discriminate, perhaps reasonably in many
cases, against women are questioned on the basis of the Convention on
the Political Rights of Women, it is highly probable that the powers of
the states to ignore international standards relating to marriage and
other domestic relations 1villlikewise be called intq,question.

D. Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Recognition of
Decrees Relating to Adoption
Marriage is not the only matter of family law which has produced interest among those desiring a uniform system of international private
law. The Hague Conference has also adopted a Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions.55 Like marriage, adoption has usually been regarded as a state
matter. Yet, this Convention would impose upon the states obligations
regarding adoptions which might contravene their present law. The
provisions of the Convention stipulate circumstances under which all
parties to the Convention must recognize adoptions and revocations
and annulments of adoptions granted by the authorities of other contracting nations. The Convention establishes a full faith and credit
principle for foreign adoptions.56 Thus, if the United States should ratify the Convention, the states would no longer be competent to determine the wisdom of enforcing foreign adoptions. The Convention does
recognize the legitimacy of local interest in adoption matters by providing that, notwithstanding other provisions of the Convention, a
country might refuse to enforce a foreign judgment if that judgment is
"manifestly contrary to its public policy."ri7 This concession to public
54 U.N. Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952). This con\·ention is reproduced in I !NT'L LAw 597·99 (1967).
55 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Dc:crccs Relating to Adoption (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention on Adoption]. This
convention is reproduced in 4 lNT'L LEGAL 1\{ATERJALS 338-41 (1965).
56 Article 8 provides in part: "Every adoption governed by the present Com·ention
and granted by an authority having jurisdiction under the first paragraph of article S
shall be recognized without further formality in all contracting St:ltes." Hague Con\'ention.on Adoption, art. 8; 4 INT'L LEGAL l\{AT£RIALS 339.
57 Article 15 provides: "The provisions of the present Com•cntion may be disreg:mlcd
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policy does not salvage the traditional powers of the states, however,
for the public policy intended is that of the ratifying nation, not its
political subdivisions. Additionally, the construction of the word, "man·
ifestly," would be determined as a matter of federal or perhaps international law, so 'that a state would not be free to enforce its public pol·
icy without regard to federal or international standards.
This review of efforts in the international community to formulate
international private law in the field of family law has not touched
upon all such efforts, for the purpose has been merely to illustrate the
potential impact of this movement upon the domestic relations law of
the United States. Ratification of these international agreements could
produce a profound realignment of the powers of the states and the
federal governtnent in the regulation of family law matters. There is a
fundamental question, however, about the constitutional power of the
federal government to ratify these agreements, for it cannot be lightly
assumed that the treaty power vests the United States with authority to
bind the states in family law matters.
Ill.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE TREATY POWER

The treaty power is expressly delegated to the federal government
by the Constitution.Gs Scrutinizing the Constitution as the source of
this power, one can find no explicit restrictions. Yet, the supremacy
clause notwithstanding, it is the thesis of this Article that there are in·
herent in the Constitution and implicit in the nature of the federal sys·
tem, restrictions which would invalidate ratification of some of the preceding treaties and other international agreements.r;o
Thomas Jefferson recorded four limitations on the treaty power in
his Manual of Parliamentary Practice.60 Two of these are of primary
in contracting States only when their observance would be manifestly contrary to public
policy." Hague Convention on Adoption, art. 15; 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS llll!l.
58 U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which is reproduced in note 7 supra.
50 For discussion of the right of the states to insist upon their constitutional preroga·
tives notwithstanding a purported renunciation of those prerogatives on thclr behalf by
the federal government under the treaty-making power, sec note 112 infra.
60 Jefferson wrote:
By the Constitution of the United States, this department of legislation is confined
to two branches only, of the ordinary legislature: the President originating, and the
Senate having a negative. To what subject this power extends has not been defined
in detail by the Constitution, nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves. (1) It is
admitted that it must concern the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it would
be a mere nullity, res inter alios acta. (2) By the general power to make treaties, the
Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects which nrc ustt·
ally regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated. (ll) It must have meant
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relevance to the present inquiry. The first Secretary of State wrote that
the power "must have meant to except out .•• the rights reserved to the
States," 61 doubtlessly alluding to the rights reserved to the states under
the tenth amendment. While several scholars have suggested that history has discredited Jefferson on this point,02 the author suspects that
most American lawyers assume intuitively that family law is an exclusfvely state matter.63 The second relevant limitation on the treaty power
asserted by Jefferson ·was that only matters normally negotiated among
nations would be proper subjects of treaties.04 The internal domestic
concerns of countries seldom become matters for international negotiation. Although cases squarely presenting Jefferson's views have seldom
arisen, dicta and occasional holdings in Supreme Court opinions suggest that Jefferson was accurately stating implict constitutional restrictions on the treaty power.

A. The Tenth Amendment
Most basic texts on domestic relations state that federal courts lack
jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of family law.011 These sources
usually cite a handful of old cases as authority for this proposition.ca
A review of these cases unfortunately discloses that the courts have
rarely articulated the bases of their holdings. With an equal lack of
to except out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surcly the President 3Jld
Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole go\•ernment is interdicted from doing
in any way. (4) And also to except those subjects of legislation in which it gave a
participation to the House of Representatives. This last exception is denied by some,
on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on.
The less the better, say others.
JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE (1837), quoted in 5 J. l\{ooRE, Dua:sr

T.
OF 1Nn:RNATIONAL

LAw 162 (1906).

Id.
62 E.g., Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rig!Jts, supra
note 6, at 1017 Gefferson's Manual is cited as evidence of its author's "bad guesses').
63 For the views of earlier generations of lawyers, which the present \\Titer bclievcs
are no different from those of today's practitioners, see Wadlington, Divorce Witllout
Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L REv. 32, 36 (1966): "In addition, under the new fcderol
constitution, regulation of marriage was considered a matter resen·ed to the indMdual
states in accord with the tenth amendment."
64 Item (2) states: "By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must ha\·e
intended to comprehend only those objects which arc usually regulated by treaty, 3Jld
cannot be otherwise regulated." T. JEFFERSON, supra note 60.
65 J. BISHoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION § 155 (1891); H. CLARE, Dom:snc RELATIONs § 11.1, at 286 (1968); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS § 25, at 84 (2d ed. 1970).
- 66 See note 3 supra.
61

70

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 55

articulated reasoning, the courts have also said that Congress has no
authority to enact legislation affecting domestic relations matters.07
1. judicial Authority.-Probably the most widely cited case for the
proposition that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over divorce
matters is Barber v. Barber,68 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1859. In this case, a wife, who was a New York resident
brought suit in federal court against her ex-husband, who resided in
Wisconsin, to recover alimony arrearage under a New York decree.
Jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship was subsequently upheld
by the Supreme Court; however, the Court disclaimed altogether any
jurisdiction in the federal courts over divorce or for the allowance of
alimony either as an original proceeding or as an incident to divorce. 09
The basis for this holding is apparent from the dissent where it was
observed that the English courts at the time .of the transplantation of
English law to America did not possess jurisdiction over matters of
divorce and alimony. Since the authority of the courts of the United
States in equity is limited to that of the English Chancellor, it was reasoned, the federal courts also lacked marital jurisdiction.70
67 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (Weinstein, J.). In this
case Judge Weinstein interpreted the now famous dictum in In re Burrus, 186 U.S. 586

(1890):

The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child
belongs to the laws of the United States.
Id. at 593-94. He stated that "this broad disclaimer refers only to the legislative power of
the federal government to lay down substantive rules of law in the domestic relations
area, not to the subject matter jurisdiction-the competence-of the federal courts," 283
F. Supp. at 804.
68 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859) (Wayne, J.).
69 Justice Wayne said:
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding
in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board.
Id. at 584.
70 Justice Daniel stated:
It has been repeatedly ruled by this court that the jurisdiction and practice In the
courts of the United States in equity are not to be governed by the practice of State
courts, but that they are to be apprehended and exercised according to the principles
of equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our
knowledge of those principles - ••• Now, it is well known that the court of cltnnccry In
England does not take cognizance of the subject of alimony, but that this is one of
the subjects within the cognizance of the ecclesiastical court, within whose pccttllar
jurisdiction marriage and divorce are comprised. Of these matters, the court of
chancery in England claims no cognizance. Upon questions of settlement or of con·
tract connected with marriages, the court of chancery will undertake enforcement of
such contracts, but does not decree alimony as such, and independently of such con·
tracts.
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Since 1859 Barber has frequently been cited in support of a constitutionalliniita:tion on the jurisdiction of the federal courts in family law
cases.71 This interpretation of the case has recently elicited some comment. In the ·case. of Spindel v. Spindel,12 tl1e District Court for the
Eastern District of New York suggested that Barber was simply a construction of the "statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts
and not of the Constitution itsel£.78 Jurisdiction in Spindel was based
on diversity of citizenship. The plaintiff brought a tort action for
damages -for a fraudulently induced marriage and also sought declaratory judgment that her husband's Mexican "quickie" divorce was void.
The defendant, relying on Barber. moved to dismiss the complaint for
want of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The court pointed out that while earlier cases had
denied affirmative relief in family law cases, the instant case simply
called for a determination of the validity of an earlier divorce decree.74
Discolinting the proffered interpretation of Barber, the court denied
the defense motions and proceeded to adjudicate the claims using the
substantive law of the state.71i The holding is not really a drastic departure from Barber in view of the fact that Barber itself recognized
the power of a federal court to enforce a decree already obtained from
a state court.76 Moreover, since the request for declaratory judgment
Id. at 604 (Daniel, J., dissenting). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888); Font:lin
v. Ravena!, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 392-93 (1855).
'l1 E.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); De L:l Rama \'.De L:l
Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); Duc:chold v.
Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Dlank v. Dlank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (W.D. P:~.
1971).
72- 283 F. Supp. '197- (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
73 The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) vests in the fcder:U courts power in
diversity cases to hear "civil actions" and that "civil actions" historically denoted matters
"of a civil nature at common law or equity." 283 F. Supp. at 802.
74 A dose reading of Barber indicates that the Supreme Court recognized the difference between the power to grant a divorce and the power to decide whether a dh·orce
was valid. It rejected the dissent's position that all aspects of domestic relations were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts and carefully a\·oided placing a
blanket prohibition upon the 'exercise of federal jurisdiction in this 3re3.
283 F. Supp. at 809.
75 The court found the Mexican divorce invalid under New York law. 283 F. Supp.
at 813.
76 Although disclaiming all jurisdiction in the federal courts to grant dh·orces or
allow alimony, Justice Wayne stated:
We have already shown, by many authorities, that courts of equity h:l\·e a jurisdiction
to interfere to enforce a decree for alimony, and by cases decided by this court; that
the jurisdiction of the courts of equity of the United States is the same as th:&t of
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was coupled with a claim for damages for fraudulent inducement to
marriage, the case may be a mere extension of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction.77
Cases decided since Spindel have produced no innovative results.
In Williamson v. Williamson,78 the District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma dismissed an action by a wife against her husband
for an order declaring her the owner of half of the couple's community
property. In the court's view, a century of unchallenged precedents
precluded any federal court from becoming a forum for marital combat. 79 Thus, the court concluded that domestic relations are the "sacro·
sanct preserve of the state courts."8°
In Buechold v. Ortiz,81 a German national brought suit in federal
court against a resident of California to establish paternity and obtain
support for her child. In holding that the 1956 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Germany
did not apply to the case, the court repeated the familiar litany:
[I]t is well established that the federal courts must decline jurisdiction of cases concerning domestic relations when the primary
issue concerns the status of parent and child or husband and wife. 82
The court distinguished Spindel on the basis that it was an attack on
the validity of an existing decree rather than a suit to establish status. 83
In the case of Cain v. King,B4 a federal court adjudicated a suit
England, whence it is derived. On that score, alone, the jurisdiction of the court in
the case before us cannot be successfully denied.
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 592 (1859). See also Vann v. Vann, 294 F. Supp.
193 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), where the court refused to dismiss a wife's complaint seeking to
declare void a Tennessee divorce decree obtained by her husband. Citing Spindel, the
court in Vann held that where a state judgment has been obtained fraudulently and in
derogation of constitutional rights, the federal courts may hear challenges to the validity
of the decree.
"17 Such jurisdiction "exists whenever the state and federal claims 'derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact' and are such that a plaintiff 'would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one proceeding.'" UMW v. Gibbs, 883 U.S. 715 (1966).
'18 306 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
"19 ''There is no dearth of authority. For more than 100 years in this country, marital
combatants have sought to make the federal courts their arena. Their attempts have
been singularly unsuccessful." Id. at 517.
80 Id.
81 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
82 Id. at 372.
8!1 "In reaching our decision we distinguish the recent case of Spindel v. Spindel •• , ,
That was an attack on the validity of a Mexican divorce decree rather than a suit to
establish status.'' Id. at 374.
84 313 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. I.a. 1970).
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brought by a wife to recover· payments due under a settlement agreement incorporated into a state divorce decree. However, the court
characterized the suit as a simple contract action brought under the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, rather than a domestic relations matter.
It thus appears that despite recent decisions which touch tangentially
upon domestic relations, most federal courts have been un'\'lilling to
interject themselves into the milieu of family law. On the other hand,
the dicta in Barber speaks only to the authority of the federal courts;
nothing is said about the power of the federal legislature to enact laws
affecting domestic relations.
2. Legislatipe Authority.-The most forceful holding on the question of federal power to make laws pertaining to domestic relations, as
well as of the power of the federal courts to hear family law matters, is
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler.85 This case involved a suit against the
vice-consul of Rumania for divorce and alimony. The consul's wife
brought suit in a state court of Ohio, and the consul objected to the
jurisdiction of that court· on the ground that the Constitution and
the federal judicial code gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving ambassadors.86 In a brief opinion for a unanimous
court, Justice Holmes upheld the state court jurisdiction on the basis
of his view that the "whole subject" of domestic relations laws belonged to the states.87 In support of his decision, Justice Holmes cited
as "common understanding" at the time the Constitution was adopted
85 280 U.S. 379 (1930). See also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890), whc:rc Justice Miller
stated:
Obviously, although the statutes of the United States ha\'e since enlarged the juris·
diction of the Circuit Courts by declaring that they shall have original jurisdiction,
· concurrent With the courtS of the several States, of all civil suits arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority, the difliculty is not remo\'ed by this provision, for, as we
·have already said, the custody and guardianship by the parent of his child does not
arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States and is not depen·
dent on them.
Id. at 595-96.
86 U.S. CoNsr. art. m, § 2, cl. 1, provides in part: "The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, • • • to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other publlc
Ministers and Consuls ••• the Supreme Court shall ha\'e original Jurisdiction."
The Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 256, 36 Stat. 1161, corresponds in
substance with 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970) which provides: "The district courts shall ha\·e
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all actions and proceedings
against consuls of foreign states."
87 280 U.S. at 383 (1930).

74

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 55

the fact that familial matters were "reserved to the States." 88 Justice
Holmes was clearly not limiting himself to the language of the statutes
which give the federal courts their jurisdiction; he was defining the
constitutional limitations of the powers of the federal judiciary and
legislature.
·Thus, unlike the Spindel interpretation of Barber, Popovici clearly
defines constitutional issues. The underlying basis of the Barber·
Popovici line of cases is the strong conviction on the part of the federal
bench that the power to deal with domestic relations is reserved to the
states under the tenth amendment. Chief Justice Taney's eloquent
opinion in Strader v. Graham89 is expressive of this view. Strader
involved a suit to recover the value of slaves allegedly spirited outside
the country by the defendants. The owner of the slaves was residing
with the slaves in Kentucky at the time of their abduction. The defense
did not contest the plaintiff's allegations of the basic facts; rather it
contended that the slaves were freedmen. The defense pointed out that
sometime earlier the plaintiff had taken the slaves with him into Ohio,
which, prior to its admission into the Union, had been part of the
Northwest Territory. This territory was governed by the Ordinance
of 1787 which provided in part that there should be no slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the territory except for the punishment of
crimes follmVing due conviction.90 The defense argued that by opera·
don of the Ordinance the slaves were emancipated when their owner
transported them across the Ohio border. The issue before the Court,
in its simplest terms, was whether the federally enacted law of Ohio or
the law of Kentucky W'¥l determinative of the status of the slaves. The
Chief Justice held Kentucky law applicable by observing that while
the slaves had been taken into Ohio, they voluntarily returned to Ken·
tucky which was, therefore, their domicile. Chief Justice Taney stated:
"[E]very State has an undoubted right to determine status, or domestic
and social condition, of the persons domiciled within its tcrritory."Ol
The Chief Justice was unable to find any constitutional mandate for
federal intrusion into the law of Kentucky.
, Strader clearly holds that the federal government possessed no con·
stitutional authority to deal ·with domestic relations matters and that
the sole authority to do so resided with the states. Of course, the thir88 Id. at 383·84 (1930).
89 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850).
90 Id. at 94.

91Id. at 93.
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teenth amendment superseded state laws permitting slavery, but the
case has clear implications for more than status servi, since the Chief
justice spoke of the unquestioned right of the states to determine status
generally. While the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
have imposed limitations upon the ways in which states may e.xercise
their reserved rights, these amendments have not otherwise ousted the
states from areas of law traditionally reserved to them. In fact, several
years· after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, a state court
relied upon Strader in holding that the state of domicile of a married
person had plenary power to deal ·with his marital status.92
Strader, its predecessors,93 and its progeny would be meaningless if
the justices who authored the opinions were not convinced that there
existed certain subjects over which the federal government has no
control. Strader expressed this reservation in terms of status. The subsequent case of Andrews v. Andrews94 made it clear that "marital"
status was included. Massachusetts had refused to recognize the divorce
which the Andrews had obtained after establishing temporary domicile
in South Dakota. The full faith and credit clause was urged as a basis
for compelling .Massachusetts to recognize the judgment of a sister
92 Hunt v. Hunt. 72 N.Y. 217 (1878). In recent years there bas been considerable
pressure on the courts to expand the jurisdictional basis upon which stnte courts might
deal with marital status by shortening the length of residency requirements. E.g., Whot
v. Wheat. 229 Ar~ 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) (three months residency was upheld);
Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954) (a conclush·e stntutory presnmption of domicile upon showing a residence of one year on a militnry resc:n-ation
or base within the state was upheld); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 850, 820 S.W.2d 807 (1939)
(a statute granting divorce jurisdiction where one of the parties had resided on a military
reservation in the state for twelve months was upheld); cf. Gram•ille-Smith v. Gran,·ille·
Smiili, 214 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1954), afJ'd, 349 U.S. 1 (1955); Alton ''· Alton, 207 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1953); appeal 4ismissed as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1$4). This jurisdictional expansion
by the states in no way compromises the efficacy of Strader. Such e.-.pansion does not confer
new powers upon the federal government; rather it would merely recognize greater juris·
diction in the states. The significance of Strader lies in its holding th:lt the states, not
the federal government. have the sole authority to deal with questions of status. Fcdc:ral
law was disregarded in Strader simply because it dealt with a subject which was not
within the competence of the federal legislature.
93 Dicta in earlier Supreme Court cases had laid a solid foundation for Strader. In
1840i ·it was observed that the treaty power could not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with "the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of powets between the
general and state governments." Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840). In
1847 language to the effect that neither a treaty nor a statute could "a:bitrarily cede
away any one right of a State" appeared in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 618
(1847); and almost identical language appeared in an opinion two years later. The Pas·
senger Cases, 48"U.S.·(7 How.) 282, 507 (1849) •
. 94 188 u.s. 14 (1903). . .
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state.95 Rejecting this claim categorically, Justice White stated that "it
is certain that the Constitution of the United States confers no power
whatever upon the Government of the United States to regulate marriage in the States or its dissolution." 96 This same "hands-off" attitude
was reiterated recently by Justice Black in Labine v. Vincent. 91 This
case upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which denied
the status of sole heir at law to an illegitimate child who had been
acknowledged but never legitimatized by her father. The Louisiana
law was attacked as violative of equal protection and due process. In
holding that no such constitutional imperfections were present, Justice
Black stated:
[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen
family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in
Louisiana by a man dying there is committed by the Constitution
of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the legislature of that State.9s
For the last 125 years, therefore, it has been the established rule that
the regulation of domestic relations is reserved to the states under the
tenth amendment. The many cases interpreting the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution as it relates to divorce and related matters
attest to the judicially recognized interests of the states in such matters.99 The power of the states to supervise and regulate family law has
always been jealously guarded by state and federal judges alike.
The tenth amendment, by its own terms, reserves to the states only
those powers which have not been delegated to the federal government.100 Some commentators have argued that since the federal
government is expressly empowered to enter treaties then nothing
which may be dealt with by treaty is reserved to the states.101 Indeed,
95

96
97
98

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 32.
401 u.s. 532 (1971).
Id. at 538.

99 For a discussion of the full faith and credit clause as it applies to domestic relations,
see H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 11.2, at 287-89 (1968) and note 16 supra,
100 U.S. CoNST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
101 E.g., Hartman, Federalism as a Limitation on the Treaty Power of the United
States, West Germany, and India, 18 WES. RES. L. REv. 134 (1966). Hartman argues that
in the conduct of foreign relations the United States possesses plenary power and is not
limited to the expressly delegated powers. He relies principally upon United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), which held that "the investment
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Justice Holmes, the author of Popovici, has provided precedent for the
proposition that the tenth amendment offers no obstacle to the utilization of this power. Eight years before Popovici, Justice Holmes wrote
the opinion in Missouri v. Holland, 102 a case which presented the
Court ·with a clear clash betw·een the tenth amendment and the treaty
power. In that case, Missouri challenged a federal statute passed to
implement a treaty be~veen the United States and Great Britain
dealing with birds which migrated across the border be~veen the
United States and Canada.103 Basing its claim upon the tenth amendment as well as its asserted common law title to the birds, Missouri
contended that it alone possessed the power to control the killing and
sale of these birds. The state argued that the treaty sought to infringe
upon the interests of the state--interests which the tenth amendment
reserved to Missouri. In upholding the statute, Justice Holmes made
some general observations about the nature of the United States
Government and of the treaty power. He first noted that the tenth
amendment reserves to the states only those powers which are not delegated by the Constitution to the federal government and that the
federal government is vested expressly by the Constitution with the
power to make treaties. Accordingly, he continued, where the treaty
power has been validly exercised, there can be no derogation of any
power reserved to the states. Justice Holmes stated that the determination of whether the treaty power had been lawfully exercised must be
of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution." Such a position, hoWC\'er, assumes that the
grant of the treaty power was a grant of unfettered external SO\'ereignty and ignores
the fundamental bases of a federal system. It is one thing to contend that the trc:lty
power is not limited to the expressly delegated powers, and quite another to say that
the treaty power knows no restrictions. Although the most ardent ad\·ocates of an expansive use of the treaty power concede that powers expressly bestowed on the states by
the Constitution cannot be overridden by a treaty, this concession is not enough to
preserve the integrity of the federal system. To state an absurd case, but one quite
consistent with the view that the treaty power is plenary, the federal go\'ernment could
by agreem~t with another nation abolish the states almost entirely on the ground that
a federalist system is too anachronistic in today's world and that foreign relations would
be improved if state lines were ignored. See also Nathanson, Constitutional Problems Involved in Adherence by the United States to a Convention for tlze Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 50 CoRNELL L.Q. 235, 238-39 (1965) (rhe tenth amendment is dismissed summarily in a brief paragraph entitled "1\fissouri v. Holland and All
That'').
102 252 U.S. 416 (1920). A prior statute, unsupported by treaty, had been struck down
as violative of the tenth amendment. United States v. Shau\·er, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
103 Treaty with Great Britain for Protection of Migratory Birds, August 16, 1916, 89
Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
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made in light of the nation's entire history. He then considered the
specifics of the case and concluded that "a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude"104 was involved, for without the federal stat·
ute the birds in question might become extinct. According to Justice
Holmes, the federal government could not be expected "to sit by while
a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops
are destroyed."1 05 Thus, in balancing the federal interest in protecting
the birds against the claims of the state of Missouri, he found no viola·
tion of the tenth amendment.
Since Missouri v. Holland it has been suggested that there is nothing
reserved to the states under the tenth amendment which cannot be
denied them through the treaty power.106 Such a reading of the case
is unwarranted. Justice Holmes did not hold that any exercise of the
treaty power could deprive the states of rights otherwise reserved to
them. Rather, he limited this effect to valid treaties, and he acknowl·
edged indirectly that the tenth amendment is a material consideration
in determining the validity of an exercise of the treaty power:
The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words
to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it
is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms
of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country
has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved.1or
It is apparent from his language that Justice Holmes did not consider
the tenth amendment to be irrelevant simply because the treaty power
had been invoked. His balancing of the relative interests of Missouri
and of the United States based on his findings of a national interest
of the "first magnitude" demonstrates that the case might have been
decided differently had the facts involved matters of more direct concern to the state than migratory birds. Domestic relations are certainly
of more direct concern to the states than is their title to animals ferae
naturae. Justice Holmes himself recognized this elementary distinction
eight years after Missouri v. Holland when he penned the Popovici
252 U.S. at 435.
Id. It should also be noted that the birds migrated across an international boundary
and that a valid "international concern" was, therefore, present.
106 See, e.g., Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra
note 6; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Lancl ancl
Foreign Relations, supra note 6. However, in both articles, the author primarily cmpha·
sizes the growing role of treaties in the international community to support his theory.
101 252 U.S. at 433-34.
104
105

1972]

TREATY POWER AND FAMILY LAW

79

opinion. Balancing the national interest in the protection of foreign
diplomats against a state's interest in the marriage of one of her citizens, he found the latter controlling, and accordingly, upheld the jurisdiction of the courts of Ohio over the divorce action.108
The patent distinction between Missouri v. Holland and Popovici
is that the latter did not concern the construction of a treaty. It is submitted, however, that constitutional and statutory guarantees of federal
forums for foreign diplomats are no less "the supreme law of the land"
than are treaties or other international agreements. Clearly Justice
Holmes did not intend Missouri v. Holland to have the sweeping scope
that some latter-day scholars would attribute to it.10D
This comparison of Missouri v. Holland and Popovici emphasizes
that the scope of the treaty power cannot ·be determined in a given
case ·without consideration of the legitimacy of the inherent interests
of- the states in the subject-matter of the treaty.uo The traditional
interests of the states in regulating family law matters must be given
great weight in reaching that determination. These interests have
already been recognized by one American representative at an international conference considering international agreements on family law.
The United States representative signed the 1962 Convention of Consent to marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of
Marriages only after stating that while the United States itself could
agree to be bound by the Convention, its ratification of the Convention
could impose no responsibilities upon the states.m This attempt to
limit the participation of the United States in this Convention may not
comport with a rule of international law that a nation which has ratified a treaty will not be excused from the performance of its obligations
under the treaty merely because it has not observed its own constitutionallimitations.112 This rule of international law would render the
lOS Justice Holmes wrote that "the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent
and child were matters reserved to the States ••••" Ohio ex rt:l. Popo\•ici \', Agler, 280
U.S. 379, 384 (1930). [emphasis added]. See notes 85-88 supra and accomp:m)ing text.
109 See note 106 supra.
uo Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942): "It is, of course, true that C\·en
treaties with friendly nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the
authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to cll'ectuate
the national policy." Even those who find in Missouri v. Holland a negation of the
reserved rights of the states where a treaty is present usually balance the respecti\·e
federal and state interests. Thus, Professor Hartman concludes that "when local matters
themselves extend into the affairs of natious so that international cooperation is required,
they become proper subjects of treaties." Hartman, supra note 101, at 149.
1U U.N. Doc. AJPV 1167, at 33-35 (1962). See note I supra for the text of his statement.
112 See J. HENDRY• TREATIES AND FEDERAL CoNmTU110NS 187-62 (1955). There is a
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federal government answerable in the international community for a
subsequent failure to enforce the treaty in the states, but it would not
remove the constitutional disabilities of the federal government. Yet
whatever the rule of international law may be, it cannot confer extraconstitutional powers upon the United States.

B. Proper Subjects For International Agreements
The treaty power is properly exercised only where the subject-matter
addressed is one of "international concern." 113 Thus, it cannot be in·
voked to deal with the purely internal concerns of a nation. This rule,
like the limitation placing the reserved powers of the states beyond the
reach of treaties, was first articulated by Thomas Jefferson.114 In expressing the opinion that a treaty "must concern the foreign nation,
party to the contract, or it would be a mere nullity... ,"111i Jefferson
continuing debate among students of international law as to the enforceability of treaty
obligations assumed by a nation in violation of its internal constitutional law. On the
one ltand, the monists regard such treaties as unenforceable, holding that internal law is
part and parcel of international law. The dualists, on the other hand, argue that inter•
national law exists independently of the internal sphere. The United Nations Conference
on the Law of Treaties has formulated a middle position, namely, that the treaties arc
enforceable unless the violation of internal law is "manifest." Kearney, Internal Limitations
on External Commitments-Article 46 of the Treaties Convention, 4 lNT'L LAw. 1, 8
(1969); see Hague Convention on Adoption, art. 15 (set out in note 57 supra). Since the
present Article addresses itself to the enforceability of treaties under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution, considerations of the operation of treaties under international law
per se are irrelevant.
113 A clear statement of this limitation relates back to the now famous remarks made
in 1929 by Charles Evans Hughes, former Secretary of State and already designated Chief
Justice of the United States. Mr. Hughes remarked:
I should not care to voice any opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty·
making power. The Supreme Court has expressed doubt whether there could be
any suclt. That has been expressed in one of its opinions. But if there is a limltatioh
to be implied, I should say it might be found in the nature of the treaty making
power.
It [the treaty·making power] is not a power to be exercised, it may be assumed,
with respect to matters that have no relation to international concerns.
But if we attempted to use the treaty-making power to deal with matters whiclt
did not pertain to our external relations but to control matters whiclt normally
and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the States, then I again
say there might be ground for implying a limitation upon the treaty·making power
that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs
and not to make laws for the people of the United States in their internal concerns
through the exercise of the asserted treaty-making power.
23 Pnoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 194, 195-96 (1929).
114 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 60.
115 Id.
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was apparently suggesting that only foreign or international affairs
could be legitimate subjects of a treaty. He was also asserting that any
nation with which the United States attempts to deal by treaty must
have some bona fide interest in the subject matter of the treaty. These
limitations would preclude, for instance, an attempt by the federal
government to resolve purely domestic matters which concern no other
nation by concluding a mock. treaty.116
Fortunately, the United States has never sought to utilize the treaty
power to dispose of a purely domestic concern.U7 This disinclination
has resulted in a dearth of case law involving the international concern limitation. Proponents of international uniformity of private law
have seized upon this fact to argue that since no court has relied upon
the international concern requirement to invalidate a treaty. the rule
must not exist.118 However, this argument flaunts dicta in the opinions
of the Supreme Court.119 Moreover. in most of the cases in which the
rule might have been operative. the Court has found matters of international concern so that there has been little opportunity to apply the
rule.12o
116 Professor Henkin, an eloquent advocate of United States mtific::1tion of hum:m
rights conventions, concedes the impropriety of a mock or sham tre:lty. Henkin, "International Concern" and the Treaty Power of the United States, 63 AM. J. OF I:.'T'L L 272,

274 (1969).
117 The Supreme Court has never been asked to consider a treaty lacking "'obvious
connection with a matter of international concern.'" Power Authority v. FPC, 247 F.2d
538, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n \'. Power
Authority, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
118 Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra
note 6, at 1031-32.
119 See, e.g.• Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (''all subjects that properly
pertain to our foreign relations"); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (''all proper
subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations'1: Holden v. Joy, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) ("all those objects which in the intercourse of nations lud
usually been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation and tre:ltf1·
120 See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) (''tre:lty power of the United
States extends to all proper subject of negotiation between our government and the
governments of other nations'1: Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 PeL) 540, 569 (1840)
("power to make treaties ••• was designed to include all those subjects, which, in the
ordinary course of nations, had usually been made subjects of negotiation and tre:lty'1:
cf. 1\fissouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In rejecting the state's argument that it had
exclusive title to the migratory birds covered by the treaty, the Court in Missouri v.
Holland upheld the statute enacted pursuant to the treaty and Justice Holmes sl:ited:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is invoh·ed. It can be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject
matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent lubitat therein.
But for the treaty and statute there soon might be no birds Cor any powers to deal
with.
Id. at 435.
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For example, in Geofroy v. Riggs121 the right of an alien to inherit
property was recognized by treaty, but not by local law. In upholding
the treaty, Justice Field made an expressed finding of international
concern.122 Hence, the treaty satisfied the international concern limitation.
Despite the paucity of direct authority, the international concern
limitation has been adopted by the American Law Institute's Restate·
ment of the Law of American Foreign Relations.123 However, this rule
has been challenged by some modern scholars124 who would deem a
matter to be of international concern by the mere fact that it ·was
incorporated into a treaty. Thus, one ·writer has reasoned that "if
the status of human rights in the United States are deemed to require
regulation in the interest of United States foreign relations, Congress
has the power to deal with them." 125 While the writer was commenting
upon the power to conduct foreign relations, his remarks have equal
relevance to the treaty power. Certainly human rights could under

u.s. 258 (1890).

121

133

122

I d. at 266·67. He said that treaties extend to "all proper subjects of negotiation

between our government and the governments of other nations." Id. at 266,
123 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REI.AnONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 11'7 (1965)
provides in part:
(I) The United States has the power under the Constitution to make international
agreements if
(a) the matter is of international concern, and
(b) the agreement does not contravene any of the limitations of the Constitution
applicable to all powers of the United States.
124 E.g., Dorsey, supra note 6, at 22'7. Professor Dorsey attributes the "international
concern" restriction to Charles Evans Hughes' remarks at the 1929 annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law in which Hughes expressed the view that there
are implied limitations in the nature of the treaty power itself. 23 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 194, 195·96 (1929). These remarks are set out in note 113 supra. Professor Henkin
minimizes the significance of Hughes' remarks by observing that they were "extempora·
neous, perhaps even impromptu, not a carefully prepared statement of constitutional
doctrine." Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, supra
note 6, at 1023. Nonetheless, Hughes' remarks have received judicial approval. Sec Power
Authority v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot sub nom. American Pub.
Power Ass'n v. Power Authority, 355 U.S. 64 (195'7). In Power Authority, the court of
appeals expressly noted that Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), has not defined tlte
constitutional limits of the treaty power. 247 F.2d at 542. Sec generally Gardner, A
Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A.J. 907 (1967); Henkin, supra note 116; Tuttle, Arc tl1c
"Human Rights" Conventions Really Objectionable1 3 INT'L LAw. 885 (1969).
125 Henkin, The Treaty Maker and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign
Relations, supra note 6, at 922. Professor Henkin also has written: "I am confident that,
if the Supreme Court ever faced the question, it would not find any special requirement
of 'international concern', if that is interpreted to exclude some subjects from international
negotiation by the United States." Henkin, supra note 116, at 2'1'7.
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some circumstances become matters of international concern, but such
instances are likely to be extremely rare, especially when they relate to
family law matters. If it were ever recognized that any matter incorporated into a treaty would henceforth be considered of international concern, the authority of the federal government to preempt the states
from the exercise of their law-making power in any given area of law
would be virtually unlimited.
This is not to say, however, that those subjects which traditionally
have been regarded as purely domestic concerns can never be dealt
with by international agreement. The changing complexion of the
world has made it increasingly likely that heretofore internal affairs
·will have foreign implications. This may be even true-at least occasionally-'with respect to matters of family law. Marriages benveen persons
of different nationalities are more common today than in past eras, and
natioi.ts may well have an interest in protecting their nationals who
enter into such marriages. Adoptions and divorces also can involve
pe~ons of diverse nationality.126 To the extent that a nation acts to
protect its own citizens by iriternational agreement, that nation is
pii~ting its treaty powers to proper use. Historically, treaties have been
used to secure international respect for the rights of citizens of the
~ontracting nations. Concomitantly, a nation which ratifies a treaty
designed to protect its citizens has an interest in the subject matter of
the treaty, since nations are responsible for the welfare of their nationals and must, therefore, be regarded as interested parties.
Thus, to the extent that its nationals are affected by the terms of a
particular treaty, a nation may legitimately view those terms as relating
to a matter of international concern. Many of the provisions of the
international agreements presently under consideration, however, purport to <!eal in a sweeping fashion with family law matters. The
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, for example, provides that parties,
126 One supporter of the "international concern" limitation bases his beUef th:it hum:m
rignts generally are improper subjects for a treaty upon the conviction th:it treaties em
be viable only insofar as there is a realistic expectation th:it they will achieve their
objectives. He concludes that unleis treaty provisions are sufiidently explicit to confer
specific benefits upon the parties, it is unrealistic to expect "efi'ecti\·e international cooperative and reciprocal actions" to follow. Dorsey, supra note 6, at 227. He argues th:it
"[b]y the test of realism ••• the previously internal matters of political, economic, and
social rights of nationals of developed states inter se within their own territories remain
entirely internal, and are1lot appropriate subjects for the exercise of the treaty power."
Id. at 220.
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shall not be competent to marry unless they have attained the age of
fi£teen.127 This restriction pertains to every marriage, not merely those
betw·een persons of different nationalities. It may be inferred, therefore,
that the signatories are not motivated merely by a desire to protect
their own citizens from imprudent marriages; rather, they are seeking
to establish humane or perhaps merely uniform standards throughout
the world. Such motives may well be laudable in themselves, but the
fact remains that the contracting nations are attempting to influence
transactions in which they have no real interest. The incidence of binational marriages is so insignificant that the resolution of problems
concerning them ought not to be achieved by the promulgation of a
rule which encompasses all marriages. If the international community
perceives a need to regulate the bi-national marriage, it should act
specifically.128
Until a nation demonstrates that it is affected by the internal affairs
of another nation, it has no standing to exert an influence upon the
internal laws of that other nation. The constitutional history of the
United States suggests that the treaty power was never envisioned as
a vehicle to give foreign nations a voice in the legislative processes of
this country; indeed, few would deny that at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution the states were extremely jealous of their prerogatives. While it is true that the Articles of Confederation demonstrated
that too much decentralization produces an anemic government, it is
equally true that only certain powers were bestowed upon the federal
government in the Constitution. Since the founding fathers intended
to invest the national government with only a certain quantum of
authority, it is unlikely that they meant the treaty power to be plenary.
Without restrictions upon the treaty power, there would be no limitations upon the federal government except for those powers expressly
denied it in the Constitution. The federal government would be transformed into one of general rather than of delegated authority. In light
See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
Cf. Annex 1 to the Note Verbale of the Embassy of the United States of America
dated August 3, 1959 (concerning the Status of Forces Agreement between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany), where the United States agreed to assist
German authorities in serving process upon American servicemen named in paternity
actions and to serve any judgment rendered by a German court in such suits. This
supplementary agreement illustrates that with the American military presence in Europe,
some family law matters can assume international significance. Note, however, that the
agreement does not undertake the enforcement of the German decrees in the United
States.
127
128
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of the motives of the draftsmen of the Constitution, common sense
dictates that the treaty power be confined to such matters as are necessary for the functioning of the national government in the international community.129 The treaty power was designed to enable the
federal government to deal ·with foreign nations in matters which
legitimately affect those nations; it ·was not intended to subject this
country to the whims of other nations over matters which do not affect
them. This traditional view of the treaty power explains why the
United States has not used the power to dispose of internal concerns.
The proposed international agreements relating to family law call for
a novel utilization of the treaty power, for they would obligate the
United States with respect to matters which do not affect any other
nation or nationals of any other nation.
The conditions for marriage in the several states are of little concern
to other nations. It should make little difference to the countries which
have signed the Convention of Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages that some American states
make twenty-one the age of consent while others make it eighteen. Nor,
indeed, should other nations complain that a few states allow their
citizens to marry at fourteen years of age. Perhaps, the sensibilities of
the peoples of other nations are offended by the existence of commonlaw marriages in some of the states of the United States. However, their
displeasure surely does not give them the power to join with the federal
government in changing those laws. It was to preclude just such intermeddling that Thomas Jefferson stated that a treaty must "concern
the other nation" and deal with subjects usually dealt '\'lith by treaty.
It is difficult to conceive of an area of the law which is more restricted to the geographical boundaries of a nation than laws relating
to domestic relations. Only in rare instances do family law matters
129 Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). It is true that in Pink a tTcaty was
held to prevail over an inconsistent state law, but the other party to the tTcaty, Russia,
had a clearly demonstrable interest in the subject matter of the tTcaty, for the foOlS of
the controversy was the right of Russia to property claims that it had assigned to the
United States. Professor Chafee attempts to justify tTcaties relating solely to internal
affairs on the grounds that what happens within one nation may affect affairs in another
and that displeasure with another nation's internal policies may prompt one nation
to resort to war. Chafee, Federal and State Powers Under the U.N. Conventions on Human
Rights, 1951 Wis. L ru:v. 389, 468-73 (1951). 'While such considerations may ha\'e limited
validity in conjunction with certain international agreements, it is inconceh-able that
they could assume significance in family Jaw matters. It is difficult to foresee any efi'ect,
direct or indirect, that American family Jaw might ha\'e upon either the domestic life
or the international affairs of another country.
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acquire international significance. Thus, in examining the proposed
conventions and other agreements relating to family law, it is essential
that the interests of the contracting nations in the subject matter of the
agreements be explored. If the other countries are simply attempting
to compel the United States to adopt family law rules which are accept·
able to them but in which they have no interest, the agreement should
not be ratified by the United States. On the other hand, the sole fact
that the international agreement in question relates to domestic rela·
tions does not ipso facto remove the subject matter from legitimate
international interest. In each instance the competing interests of the
several states and the international community should be weighed.
The international concern limitation expounded in this section of
this Article must be read in conjunction with the tenth amendment
limitation, although it may in some cases be less restrictive than the
restraints of the tenth amendment. For example, the recognition of
foreign divorce decrees may well be of international concern, but per·
haps the enforcement of such decrees is a matter reserved to the states
under the tenth amendment, at least as they relate to domiciliaries of
the states. The amendment certainly poses a more serious obstacle to
the ratification of international agreements concerning domestic rela·
tions than does the requirement of international concern. This is
primarily because the requirement for international concern has re·
ceived less attention from the courts due perhaps to the fact that the
amendment explicitly reserves certain powers to the states while the
requirement for international concern is merely implicit in the Consti·
tution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While the treaty power may be one of the most all-encompassing
of the powers conferred upon the United States by the Constitution,
it is not without limitations. This Article has explored these limitations
in relation to the area of domestic relations. A review of over a century
of case law has demonstrated that any attempt to invoke the treaty
power as a basis for federal promulgation of family law rules will fail,
since only in rare instances could such attempts relate to proper matters of international concern; and, even if international concerns were
involved, the interests of the states, as those interests are preserved by
the tenth amendment, would undoubtedly outweigh those of the
federal government.

